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       New York, NY 10004 
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       Keith L. Flicker, Esquire 
       Flicker, Garelick & Associates 
       318 East 53rd Street 
       New York, NY 10022 
 
        Counsel for Respondent -- Global 
       Terminal and Container Services, 
       Inc. 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
James Barbera ("Barbera") petitions for r eview of final 
orders of the United States Department of Labor Benefits 
Review Board (the "Board") affir ming in part and reversing 
in part Orders of Administrative Law Judge Edith Barnett 
("ALJ Barnett") and affirming Or ders of Administrative Law 
Judge Linda Chapman ("ALJ Chapman").1 Petitioner makes 
two claims. First, he claims that the Board err ed in 
affirming ALJ Barnett's denial of a de minimis award under 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the 
"LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. SS 901 et seq. , where ALJ Barnett 
found proof of Petitioner's present medical disability and a 
reasonable expectation of future loss of wage-earning 
capacity. Second, he claims that, (a) absent a finding of 
abuse of discretion, the Board err ed in reversing ALJ 
Barnett's award of attorney's fees to Petitioner's counsel, 
and (b) the Board further erred in subsequently affirming 
ALJ Chapman's significant reduction in counsel's hourly 
rates. Petitioner specifically alleges that the Board 
erroneously departed from its proper standard of 
administrative review. 
 
Because we conclude that, on the findings made by ALJ 
Barnett and supported by substantial evidence, and on the 
law as pronounced by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan 
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997), Petitioner 
was clearly entitled to a de minimis awar d, we will reverse 
the Board and remand for determination of that award. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Our jurisdiction over these matters is pursuant to 33 U.S.C. S 921(c). 
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Further, because we conclude that ALJ Bar nett's award of 
attorney's fees was supported by substantial evidence and 
in accordance with the law, and that the Boar d was 
therefore without authority to disturb that award, we will 





The basic facts are not in dispute. Petitioner's 
employment as a maintenance manager for Global T erminal 
& Container Services, Inc. ("Global") r equired him to inspect 
and estimate damage on shipping containers by climbing 
stacked containers and securing access through heavy 
container doors sometimes corroded by rust. On April 16, 
1991, while attempting to force open the doors to a stacked 
container, Petitioner suffered an accident at Global's pier in 
Jersey City, New Jersey. As a result of this accident, he 
sustained a disabling herniation to his lower back. Because 
he was unable to continue his previous employment due to 
his disability, Petitioner sought and found employment as 
a surveyor with China Ocean Shipping Company in 
Charleston, South Carolina. Petitioner's orthopedic surgeon 
concluded that Petitioner's injury requir ed a marked 
restriction of activities and that further spinal degeneration 
and progression of symptomology wer e inevitable.2 
 
Petitioner sued for workers' compensation pursuant to 
the LHWCA3 and his employer , Global, challenged 
jurisdiction and Petitioner's right to compensation. On 
February 27, 1996, following a three-day hearing and a 
complete review of Petitioner's medical r ecord, ALJ Barnett 
found that (a) Petitioner met the status and situs 
requirements for jurisdiction under the LHWCA, and (b) 
Petitioner had been temporarily totally disabled for a period 
of several months and had sustained a permanent partial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Indeed, Petitioner's back condition did continue to degenerate, and he 
underwent back surgery. Petitioner alleges he has been unable to work 
in any capacity since January 1999. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2. 
 
3. The LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. SS 901-50 (1994), is a workers' compensation 
statute that fixes disability benefits for maritime workers who are 
injured 
on the job. 
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disability. Accordingly, she awarded Petitioner medical 
benefits under the LHWCA. ALJ Barnett did not, however, 
award any compensation for lost wage ear ning capacity 
because Petitioner was then employed in another position 
for wages comparable to his pre-injury ear nings. As more 
fully explained in her Supplemental Decision and Or der of 
April 26, 1996, despite her finding that Petitioner's "serious 
back condition" was "likely to deteriorate and m[ight] cause 
loss of wage earning capacity in the futur e" and despite her 
awareness that "[s]ubstantial authority does exist for de 
minimis awards where, as here, there is proof of a present 
medical disability and a reasonable expectation of future 
loss of wage-earning capacity",4  because this circuit had 
not considered the issue, ALJ Barnett felt compelled to 
follow the Board's policy of disfavoring any de minimis award.5 
 
On the issue of Petitioner's attorney's fees, ALJ Barnett 
directed counsel to submit a fully documented fee 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Supplemental Decision and Order of ALJ Barnett, April 26, 1996 (33a- 
34a) (citing La Faille v. Benefits Review Boar d, 884 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 
1989); Randall v. Comfort Control, 725 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Hole v. 
Miami Shipyards Corp., 640 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1981)). These circuits 
each held that when a claimant has suffer ed a medical disability and 
there is a significant possibility that he will suffer future economic 
harm, 
the purposes of the LHWCA are served by a nominal award expressly 
fashioned to preserve the claimant's right to future compensation. See 
also Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 81 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996), aff 'd, 
521 U.S. 121 (1997) (agreeing with 2d, 5th and D.C. Circuits that 
"nominal awards may be used to preserve a possible future award where 
there is a significant physical impair ment without a present loss of 
earnings"). 
 
5. ALJ Barnett stated: 
 
       This case, however, arises in the Thir d Circuit, which has 
evidently 
       not considered the issue. The court is ther efore bound by the 
       rulings of the Benefits Review Board, which disfavors de minimis 
       awards (citations omitted). 
 
The Board had repeatedly "expressed its dissatisfaction with de minimis 
awards of benefits," viewing them as "judicially-created" extensions on 
the time for modification, which "infring[e] upon the province of the 
legislature". Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 81 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1996), 
aff 'd, 521 U.S. 121 (1997); see also LaFaille v. Benefits Review Board, 
884 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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application. In her Supplemental Decision and Or der she 
admonished the employer's counsel for requiring Petitioner 
to litigate every issue -- including jurisdiction, which 
should not have been contested -- and for tur ning the 
motions for fee awards into "a second major litigation."6 
After a complete review of the attorney's fee application, 
ALJ Barnett found that Petitioner prevailed on jurisdiction, 
disability, and the award of medical benefits;7 she also 
observed that "[a] party cannot . . . litigate tenaciously and 
then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent 
by opposing counsel in response."8  In a Second 
Supplemental Decision and Order issued on May 14, 1996, 
ALJ Barnett ordered the employer to pay directly to 
Petitioner's counsel the sum of $71,247.89 in fees and 
costs for his successful representation of Petitioner and 
$1,060 in fees and costs for defending his fee application. 
 
Both the denial of a de minimis awar d and the award of 
attorney's fees were timely appealed and considered 
together. On February 26, 1997, the Boar d issued a 
Decision and Order in which it acknowledged that de 
minimis awards are appropriate where a claimant has 
established a "significant possibility of futur e economic 
harm as a result of the injury" but r easoned that "[a]s [ALJ 
Barnett]'s determination that claimant did not establish a 
significant possibility of future economic harm is supported 
by substantial evidence", it would "affir m the denial of a de 
minimis award."9 On the issue of attorney's fees, the Board 
held that ALJ Barnett erred in failing to apply the Supreme 
Court's holding in Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424 
(1983), requiring that an attorney's fee award be 
commensurate with the degree of success obtained in the 
case. The Board concluded that although ALJ Bar nett cited 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Supplemental Decision and Order of ALJ Barnett, April 26, 1996 (32a- 
33a). 
 
7. As ALJ Barnett noted, the award of future medical benefits constitutes 
successful prosecution under Jackson v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Division, 
Litton Systems, Inc., 15 BRBS 299 (1983). 
 
8. Supplemental Decision and Order of ALJ Barnett, April 26, 1996 
(33a). 
 
9. Decision and Order of February 26, 1997 (13a-14a). 
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Hensley, she "did not apply its holding in awarding an 
attorney's fee in excess of $71,000." The Board therefore 
vacated that award and remanded and r eassigned the case 
to ALJ Chapman10 with dir ections to adjust the fee award 
"after taking into account the limited results obtained in 
this case, specifically that only medical benefits, but no 
disability benefits, were awarded." 11 
 
Twenty months later, in October, 1998, ALJ Chapman 
found that the number of hours reflected in the fee petition 
was reasonable, but reduced the hourly rates by one-third 
for lack of evidentiary justification that they were the 
prevailing rates for similar legal work in the area. She 
further reduced the lodestar figure by two-thirds in 
accordance with her conclusion that the awar d of future 
medical benefits represented "no mor e than one-third of the 
relief requested."12 Upon Motion for Reconsideration 
submitting evidence that the rates awarded by ALJ Barnett 
were the prevailing rates for attor neys with comparable 
experience, and challenging the reduction in the degree of 
success to one-third, ALJ Chapman denied that Motion but 
changed the rationale for her reduction in the rates. She 
concluded that (a) the rates were nonetheless unreasonable 
because the amount of time charged by counsel to this 
matter strongly suggested to ALJ Chapman that counsel 
lacked expertise and (b) because ALJ Barnett's"refusal to 
grant a de minimis award indicate[d] that she did not view 
the possibility of future economic harm .. . to be significant 
enough to overcome the Board's disfavor of such awards", 
counsel had achieved a relatively small portion of the relief 
requested.13 
 
On January 28, 2000 the Board affirmed ALJ Chapman's 
fee reductions, holding that Petitioner failed to show any 
abuse of discretion and that Petitioner's "primary claim for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The case was reassigned to the r ecently-appointed ALJ Chapman due 
to the death of ALJ Barnett. 
 
11. Id. (14a). 
 
12. Decision and Order of ALJ Chapman, October 23, 1998 (44a). 
 
13. Decision and Order of ALJ Chapman on Motion for Reconsideration, 
January 11, 1999 (47a). 
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compensation" had been denied.14 At this time, the Board 
was also asked to revisit its denial of a de minimis award in 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Metropolitan 
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997).15 In a 
footnote, the Board replied that: 
 
       Even though the Board did not rely on the Supreme 
       Court's Rambo decision, which had not yet been 
       issued, the Board used the "significant possibility of 
       future economic harm" standard of the [underlying 
       Ninth Circuit decision] . . . which is consistent with the 
       standard used by the Supreme Court in its decision. 
       While Judge Barnett's denial of a de minimis award 
       may have been based on a determination that the . . . 
       Third Circuit did not speak on the issue and the Board 
       did not favor such awards, the Board, in affirming, 
       relied on correct law. 
 




We exercise plenary review over the Board's interpretation 
of law and we also exercise plenary review to satisfy 
ourselves that the Board adhered to the statutory scope of 
review. Pennsylvania Tidewater Dock Co. v. Director, OWCP, 
202 F.2d 656, 660 (3d Cir. 2000). 16 The Board must accept 
the ALJ's findings unless they are contrary to law, 
irrational or unsupported by substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole. See id.; see also O'Keeffe v. Smith 
Associates, 380 U.S. 359 (1965).17  It exceeds its authority 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Decision and Order of the Board, January 28, 2000 (6a-7a). 
15. In Rambo, the Supreme Court held that an award of nominal 
compensation is proper where a worker has not suffered a current loss 
of earnings but "there is a significant possibility that the worker's 
wage- 
earning capacity will fall below the level of his preinjury wages sometime 
in the future." 521 U.S. at 123. 
16. See also Director, OWCP v.Barnes and Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 
1526-27 (3d Cir. 1992); Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 39 F.3d 
458, 463 (3d Cir. 1994). 
17. See also Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 81 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 1996), 
aff 'd, 521 U.S. 121 (1997) (noting that Board decisions "are reviewed by 
the appellate courts for `errors of law and adherence to the substantial 
evidence standard' ") (quoting Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 
F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
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when it makes independent factual determinations. See 
Director, OWCP v. U.S. Steel Corp. , 606 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 
1979).18 
 
In Rambo, the Supreme Court confir med that de minimis 
awards are appropriate where a claimant's "work related 
injury has not diminished his present wage ear ning 
capacity under current circumstances, but there is a 
significant potential that the injury will cause diminished 
capacity under future conditions." 521 U.S. at 138. The 
Court addressed the potential tension in such cases 
between the LHWCA's statutory mandate to account for 
future effects of disability in deter mining a claimant's wage- 
earning capacity (and thus entitlement to compensation) 
under 33 U.S.C. S 908(h) and its statutory pr ohibition 
against issuing any new order to pay benefits more than 
one year after compensation ends or an order is entered 
denying an award, see 33 U.S.C. S 922.19 It approved the 
reconciliation of these provisions pr eviously adopted by four 
of our sister courts of appeals, reading the LHWCA to 
authorize a present nominal award subject to later 
modification; and in so holding it rejected the Board's 
historic antipathy toward such awards. 20 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court approved the courts of appeals' standard of 
proof necessary to justify a nominal awar d, i.e., such 
compensation "should not be limited to instances where a 
decline in capacity can be shown to a high degr ee of 
statistical likelihood" but should be awar ded where "there 
is a significant possibility that a worker's wage earning 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. See also Rambo, 521 U.S. at 139 (noting that "the ALJ is the 
factfinder under the Act") (citations omitted). 
 
19. See 521 U.S. at 134 (noting that denying any compensation to a 
claimant who has no present earnings loss"would run afoul of the Act's 
mandate to account for the future effects of disability in fashioning an 
award, since . . . the 1-year statute of limitations for modification 
after 
denial of compensation would foreclose r esponding to such effects on a 
wait-and-see basis as they might arise"). 
 
20. See 521 U.S. at 131-32 (concluding that "[t]o implement the mandate 
of S 8(h) . . . "disability" must be r ead broadly enough to cover loss of 
capacity . . . as a potential product of injury and market opportunities 
in the future"). 
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capacity will at some future point fall below his preinjury 
wages." 521 U.S. at 137. 
 
It is clear from ALJ Barnett's decisions that she found 
proof of a present medical disability and a reasonable 
expectation of future loss of wage-earning capacity and that 
her sole reason for denying a de minimis award was her 
belief that the Board's prior decisions constrained her from 
doing so. It is, therefore, equally clear that the Board erred 
in recharacterizing ALJ Barnett's decision as a 
"determination that claimant did not establish a significant 
possibility of future economic harm" and was therefore not 
entitled to a de minimis award. The ALJ made no such 
determination; to the contrary, she reached precisely the 
opposite conclusion. See April 26, 1996 Supplemental 
Decision and Order (33a-34a) ("[H]er e, there is proof of a 
present medical disability and a reasonable expectation of 
future loss of wage-earning capacity".). Under the guise of 
interpreting ALJ Barnett's decision, the Board has in effect 
substituted its own contrary factual determination, in 
contravention of our holding in U.S. Steel. 21 
 
Because the Board misread ALJ Barnett's decision, it 
never considered whether her actual finding -that the 
standard for an award of de minimis  benefits had been met 
- was supported by substantial evidence. Wefind that ALJ 
Barnett's original determination was supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, including the testimony 
of Petitioner's orthopedic surgeon to the ef fect that 
Petitioner's condition would inevitably deteriorate. ALJ 
Barnett reasonably inferred fr om the medical evidence that 
there was at least a "significant possibility" that Petitioner 
would at some future time suffer economic harm as a 
result of his injury. 
 
We are troubled by the Boar d's continued unwillingness 
to uphold properly-supported nominal awar ds, in the face 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Cf. Hole v. Miami Shipyards Corp. , 640 F.2d 769, 773 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(reinstating de minimis award and observing that "it is the duty of the 
ALJ, not of the Board or of this court, to weigh the evidence and draw 
reasonable inferences therefr om"). 
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of clear direction from four courts of appeals and even the 
Supreme Court.22 
 
Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to thefindings made 
by ALJ Barnett and the direction of the Supreme Court in 
Rambo, Petitioner is entitled to a nominal award retroactive 
to September 1, 1991, the date he stopped receiving his 




This appeal also requires us to review the Board's 
determination that, contrary to the decision of ALJ Barnett, 
Petitioner's counsel is entitled to only a significantly- 
reduced fee for legal services render ed. 
 
The ALJ is given the responsibility of deter mining an 
appropriate attorney's fee award. On appeal, the Board's 
scope of review is limited; it "must uphold the ALJ's 
findings unless the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard or 
the ALJ's factual conclusions were not `supported by 
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.' " 
Pennsylvania Tidewater Dock Co. v. Dir ector, OWCP, 202 
F.3d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 33 U.S.C. S 921(b)(3)). 
Substantial evidence " `means such r elevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.' " Id. at 661 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). The Board may not r everse an ALJ's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. See Hole v. Miami Shipyards Corp. , 640 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(reversing Board, which "exceeded its statutory authority in substituting 
its judgment" for ALJ's in vacating award based on ALJ's conclusion of 
significant probability that worker would suf fer some future economic 
harm as result of injury); LaFaille v. Benefits Review Board, 884 F.2d 54, 
62 (2d Cir. 1989) (reversing ALJ and Board in concluding that where ALJ 
found a "progressive, obstructive lung disorder" which restricted 
claimant's ability to perform his for mer work, there was "substantial 
evidence that [claimant was] likely to suf fer a future loss of earnings 
as 
his condition deteriorate[d] or when his envir onment change[d]", 
entitling 
claimant to a de minimis periodic payment). 
 
23. See Rambo v. Director, OWCP, 81 F.3d 840, (9th Cir. 1996),aff 'd, 521 
U.S. 121 (1997) (reversing denial of benefits and remanding for entry of 
a nominal award). 
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award merely because it would have r eached a contrary 
conclusion. See, e.g., id. at 659. 
 
ALJ Barnett presided over this entir e case and was in the 
best position to observe firsthand the factors af fecting her 
analysis of counsel's fee award. She was familiar with 
prevailing rates for successful claimant's attorneys in her 
District and was best able to assess the repr esentation and 
services rendered. Indeed, ALJ Bar nett expressly noted 
counsel's decades-long experience in maritime litigation, 
high standing, and "success in this matter despite the 
employer's tenacious defense by experienced counsel."24 As 
these and other factors recited by ALJ Bar nett constitute 
substantial evidence supporting her determination as to the 
appropriateness of counsel's rates, that deter mination may 
not be disturbed on appeal. 
 
ALJ Barnett's decision to award counsel's full fee - with 
no "limited success" reduction - was also supported by 
substantial evidence and, moreover, was in accordance with 
the Supreme Court's holding in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424 (1983). Under Hensley, the question is whether 
"the relief obtained justified that expenditure of attorney 
time." 461 U.S. at 435 & n. 11.25 Petitioner here prevailed 
against his employer's strong contestation of jurisdiction, 
the extent of disability, and entitlement to futur e medical 
benefits. Indeed, by securing future medical benefits, 
counsel obtained a substantial benefit for Petitioner. 
Moreover, as discussed in Part II, Petitioner also prevailed 
as to the factual criteria for a de minimis award and he has 
now prevailed as to his legal entitlement on that score as 
well. 
 
In determining the degree of success as compared to the 
overall purpose of the litigation,26 ALJ Barnett felt that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Supplemental Decision and Order of ALJ Barnett, April 26, 1996 
(32a). 
25. The Court specifically directs that the focus be "on the significance 
of the overall relief obtained by the plaintif f in relation to the hours 
reasonably expended on the litigation" and notes that it is not 




26. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440 (directing that "[a] reduced fee award 
is appropriate if the relief . . . is limited in comparison to the scope 
of 
the litigation as a whole"). 
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Petitioner's counsel was entitled to the full awar d of fees. 
Although Petitioner did not succeed on every theory 
proffered, he did gain substantial benefit. ALJ Barnett 
noted that this was a complex case and requir ed careful 
preparation; she reviewed each of 36 entries as to which 
specific objections were made and concluded that there was 
no basis for reduction. Because ALJ Bar nett's decision was 
supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct 
legal standards, it should not have been disturbed. Neither 
the Board nor ALJ Chapman had a basis for substituting a 
different opinion from that of ALJ Barnett; to the contrary, 
the Board was required as a matter of law to uphold ALJ 
Barnett. Accordingly, the initial awar d of attorney's fees 
must be reinstated.27 Mor eover, to avoid further 
unnecessary litigation as to fees, we observe that Petitioner 
will be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee for the 
present appeal as well.28 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Because we find that the Board err ed in remanding ALJ Barnett's fee 
award for recalculation in the first place, it is unnecessary for us to 
address the propriety of ALJ Chapman's shifting rationales for reducing 
the rate of Petitioner's counsel's fee or of her acr oss-the-board 
reduction 
of the fee award. We note, however , the apparent injustice of applying a 
two-thirds reduction (against an alr eady reduced rate) with respect to 
hours necessarily spent to establish jurisdiction, or on other issues that 
contributed to Petitioner's successful outcome. Penalizing a litigant for 
unsuccessful claims by reducing fees ear ned on successful claims could 
have a chilling effect on the willingness of counsel to advocate even 
meritorious positions in unsettled areas of the law. If the reduction in 
the present case were to stand, it might well be seen by the bar as a 
warning that counsel should not insist on rights secured under the law 
as interpreted by the Courts, when the Boar d has announced a contrary 
interpretation. 
 
28. See Hole v. Miami Shipyards Corp. , 640 F.2d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(observing that where employer contests its liability for compensation in 
whole or in part and claimant is ultimately successful, employer must 
pay claimant's attorney's fees for services necessary to that success, 
including fees for legal services render ed before tribunals deciding 
against him, as well as for claimant's successful pr osecution of appeal 
to 
Court of Appeals). 
 





For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
decisions and orders of the Board and r einstate ALJ 
Barnett's initial award of attorney's fees to Petitioner's 
counsel; we further remand this case for entry of a nominal 
disability award and for determination of an appropriate fee 
for this appeal. 
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